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Abstract 
This study sought to examine the relationships among board activities 
and performance of firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange. This study 
used a census approach and a target population of the study comprised of all 
companies listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange between 2002 and 2016. 
A total of sixty five (65) companies were listed at the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange as at 31st December 2016. The data on board activities and 
performance of firms were extracted from annual reports of the individuals 
firms. This study employed longitudinal descriptive research design to 
determine relationships amongst board activities and performance of firms. A 
panel data regression analysis was conducted using random effects model 
which allowed the companies to have a common mean value of the intercept 
to determine whether corporate governance influence firm performance. An 
increasing trend was observed in other board activities variables such board 
ownership, board meetings, board tools, board committees and number of 
committees meetings. The study findings on the other hand revealed reducing 
trend in board tenure and board remuneration of listed firms Kenya. This was 
inferred to indicate that listed firms in Kenya have been strengthening their 
corporate governance over the study period. Regression analysis indicated that 
board activities are insignificant predators of Return on Assets, However board 
tenure, committees meetings and board remuneration were found to have a 
positive but insignificant effect on Tobin’s Q among listed firms in Kenya. 
Board ownership board tools, board meetings and number board committees 
were found to have negatively affected the performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q in listed firms in Kenya. However, only board tools significantly affected 
the performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The study concluded that listed firms 
in Kenya adopted corporate governance practices as part of the requirements 
of the regulating authority which had not impact on the specific company’s 
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performance. Based on the findings of this study, stakeholders of listed firms 
and regulating authority such as Capital Markets Authority may relook at the 
board activities policies of listed firms with the view revising the existing 
policies or formulating new and more progressive policies to ensure 
shareholder interests are protected. These policies may go a long way to ensure 
listed firms not only strengthened their board activities during poor performing 
seasons but rather clear systems and activities that provide a clear roadmap to 
guide board operations. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Tenure, Board Ownership, Board 
Meetings, Tools, Board Committees, Board Remunerations, Board Tools, 
Performance of Firms. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 According to Tricker (2015) corporate governance can be defined as 
the way power is exercised over corporate entities. It consists of the board 
activities of the enterprise and its relationships with the shareholders, with the 
managers as well as with other legitimate 
stakeholders. Corporate governance is a mixture of policies and best practices 
used by firms to achieve their goals in relation to their shareholders (Millin, 
2007). The board activities are responsibilities performed by the board and 
committees set up by board for specific duties. The board activities include: 
board tenure, board ownership, board tools, board meetings, board committees 
and board compensation. Board tenure is the duration the executives take in an 
organization. Board tenure is the duration the executives take in an 
organization. Board tenure has material effect in decision making process and 
increases director independence. Most empirical studies have suggested that 
the time required for a new director to acquire a sufficient understanding of the 
firm will range between three and five years. This is because every new task 
or responsibility has a learning curve (Kesner, 1988). Board tenure has shown 
material effect on decision making process (Kosnik, 1987). Shorter tenure 
leads to a brief reprieve in poor performance (Mathew, Paul Kamel & Cherif, 
2010). Longer tenure increases directors’ independence and firm performance 
((Westphal & Khanna, 2003). 
 Board ownership is the holdings in a firm’s stock by board members. 
Stock ownership by board members gives them an incentive to ensure that the 
firm is running efficiently and to monitor managers carefully (Brickley et al., 
1988). When board members have considerable holdings in a company’s stock 
their decisions impact their own wealth. Board members however would not 
take actions that would reduce shareholder’s wealth and thus the independence 
of the board and other monitoring mechanisms become important. Empirical 
studies show a mixed result between board ownership and firm performance. 
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Some studies gave strong a significant relationship between Board ownership 
and firm performance (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; McConnell & Serves, 
1990), while others indicated no significant relatiosndhip between board 
ownership and firm performance (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Nath, Islam & Saha, 
2015). 
 Board tools are necessary tools and aid to enable the board to be 
effective in discharging their roles and responsibilities. They include code of 
ethics and conduct, board charter, annual board work plan and board evaluation 
toolkit. Their relationship with performance of firms listed at Nairobi 
Securities Exchange (NSE) is established by this study (CMA, 2015). Board 
meetings are sessions of boards which are statutory and non-statutory (Lipton 
& Lorch, 1992). Board committees are constituted to deliberate board 
activities. Firms can establish nomination committee, audit and risk 
committee, remuneration committee, finance committee, governance 
committee among others. There is a positive relationship between percentage 
of inside directors on finance and investment committees and firm 
performance (Klein, 1998). Board and audit committee members with 
corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with firms with higher 
performance. Board committees meeting frequently are also associated higher 
performance of firms (Xie, DavidsonIII & DaDalt, 2003). There is positive 
relationship between the number of women serving in the board and firm 
performance (Green & Homroy, 2018). Boards meeting infrequently are 
unlikely to sustain any meaningful influence over corporate performance 
(Mace, 1986; Useem, 2006). Boards that meet frequently generally result in 
little or no meaningful action when they are fundamentally cosmetic (Baldwin, 
Bagley & Quinn, 2003). A board activity, measured by board meeting 
frequency, is an important dimension of board operations (Vafeas, 1999).  
 Board remuneration is fee paid to board members.  The empirical 
literature has evolved into two conflicting views. The first camp argues that 
the reason is entrenchment, or poor corporate governance, which allows 
managers to skim profits away from the firm in the form of high pay (Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). 
The second camp suggests an efficient explanation; competition for managerial 
talent forces large firms to pay managers a lot (Rosen, 1981; Gabaix & Landier, 
2008). The relationship between board remuneration and firm performance 
also varies. Firms with more nonexecutive board members pay higher wages 
to their executives and firms with zero non-executive board members actually 
have fewer agency problems and achieve a better alignment of shareholders’ 
and managers’ interests (Fernades, 2008). There is excess board compensation 
of firms with a non-family CEO compared to boards with family ties. However 
there is no relationship between the presence of family boards and firm 
performance (Wu, 2013). Jensen and Murphy (2010) argue that there is 
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significant relationship between board remuneration and firm performance. 
However these are contrast argument in the relationship between board 
compensation and firm performance (Frydman & Jenter, 2010; Jackson, Lopez 
& Reitenga, 2008). 
 
Problem Statement  
 Contentious proposals by many researchers on the relationship between 
board activities and performance of firms has remained unsettled for a long 
time. Great corporate failures around the world in recent years have 
complicated the problem. Most studies have been carried to examine the 
relationship between board activities and performance of firms and the 
outcomes have remained conflicting. Some studies established positive  
significant relationship between board activites and performance of firms 
(Van-Ness, Miesing & Kang, 2010; Mulili & Wong, 2011, Rambo, 2013; 
Okiaga, 2013; Gachoki & Rotich, 2013; Aduda et al., 2013; Lakaram, 2014; 
Wang, 2014; Badriyah et al., 2015). Other studies did not establish any 
significant relationship between board activities and firm performance (Nandi 
& Ghose, 2012; Waweru & Riro, 2013; Jacob, 2015). Ghabayen (2012) studied 
board characteristics and firm performance in Saudi Arabia and established 
positive significant relationship between board characteristics and firm 
performance. Ness and Seifert (2010) investigated the relationship between 
number of external directors and corporate performance in USA and the result 
found no significant relationship between big number of external directors and 
company performance.  
 In determination the relationship between board activities and firm 
performance most studies have used different methodologies. Most studies 
used descriptive research design with cross-sectional data and simple 
regression analyses to determine the casual relationship between board 
actvities and performance of firms which gave variant results (Rambo, 2013; 
Okioga, 2013).   Some studies used descriptive research design with panel data 
and multiple and stepwise regression analyses to determine intermediating and 
moderating relationships between corporate governance and firm performance 
which gave different outcomes (Lekaram, 2014; Debby et al., 2014; Waweru 
& Riro, 2013). In Kenya there have been studies that determine the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance on the NSE and other 
markets with different outcomes. To solve these conceptual, contextual and 
methodological gaps, this study used longitudinal descriptive research design 
and multiple regression models to determine the relationships among corporate 
governance, financial characteristics, macroeconomic factors and performance 
of firms. To achieve objectives of this study, the study was directed by the 
following research question: What is the relationship between board activities 
and performance of firms listed at the NSE? 
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PREVIOUS WORK  
Theoretical Foundation 
 Stewardship Theory was developed by Donaldson and Davis (1991). 
The theory was an innovative view in understanding relationship between 
ownership and management of a firm from the Agency Theory.  Directors are 
stewards making decisions for long term survival of firms as well as maximize 
shareholders’ wealth. Directors normally perceive firms as an extension of 
them, rather than use their resources for own interest; the executives main 
interest is ensuring the sustained life and success of the firm. The theory is 
based on the duties of executives acting as stewards, integrating their goals as 
part of the firm and recognizes the importance of structures that empower the 
steward and offers maximum autonomy built on trust (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991). This theory is very relevant to the study since it stresses on the position 
of executives to act more separately so that the shareholders’ returns are 
maximized. It leads to minimizing costs aimed at monitoring and controlling 
behaviors of executives (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). The theory 
argues that the presence of executives at the firms guarantees continuous 
performance in the firm. 
 Stakeholder Theory was developed by Freeman (1984). The theory 
takes into account diverse intrinsic interest of all stakeholders of the firm. 
Stakeholders are individuals or groups who can affect or are affected by the 
achievement of the firm’s objectives. The theory suggests that directors of a 
firm have interests of different stakeholders to serve. It is important for 
directors not to have preference in a group of network they serve in 
administering the activities of the firm and the moral perspective of the theory 
is that all stakeholders have a right to be treated fairly as this leads to a better 
firm performance (Freeman, 1999). This theory is relevant to the study since 
corporate governance practices adopted by firms heavily depend on interest of 
stakeholders and their experiences. Stakeholders that have previous bad 
experience from management errors and improper decision making will 
advocate for corporate governance practices such strict board policies among 
others. Experienced stakeholders will strive to deflate agency conflicts and 
related consequences that may affect the firm long term and profitability.  
 
Empirical Review  
 Okioga (2013) find the association between corporate governance and 
investors’ confidence and developed a forecasting model and tested the 
accuracy in obtaining predictions and found that the model was moderately 
significant. Gachoki and Rotich (2013) studied influence of corporate 
governance on performance of public organizations in Kenya using a 
descriptive design and multiple regression models and found that board 
composition has significant positive relationship with firm performance. A 
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similar, study by Wu, Lin, Lin and Lai (2009) indicated that firm performance 
is in negative and significant relation to board size, CEO duality, stock pledge 
ratio and deviation between voting right and cash flow right. On the other hand, 
firm performance is in positive and significant relation to board independence 
and insider ownership.  
 Lekaram (2014) examined relationship of corporate governance and 
performance of firms listed at the NSE. The study established that the board 
size is positive and significantly related to performance of manufacturing firms 
listed in Kenya and a large proportion of external directors lead to a higher 
shareholders’ value. A study conducted by Duc and Thuy (2013) indicated that 
elements of corporate governance such as the presence of female board 
members, the duality of the CEO, the working experience of board members, 
and the compensation of board members have positive effects on the 
performance of firms, as measured by the return on asset (ROA). 
 Ahmed and Hamdan (2015) results indicated that performance 
measures such as Return on Assets and Return on Equity are significantly 
related to corporate governance in Bahrain. Vo and Nguyen (2014) using the 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) on the dataset of 177 listed 
companies in Vietnam for the period of 5 years, from 2008 to 2012, the 
findings of this study indicate multiple effects of corporate governance on firm 
performance. First, duality role of the CEO is positively correlated with firm 
performance. Second, there is a structural change in relation between 
managerial ownership and firm performance.  
 
PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 The conceptual framework for this study provides a brief overview of 
inter linkages between research variables then presents a diagrammatic 
presentation of the study variables and how they influence each other. The 
study sought to test the relationship between board activities and performance 
of listed firms. The study expects the existence of a positive relationship 
between corporate governance and performance of listed firms.  
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Figure 1: Proposed Conceptual Framework 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 This study was based on positivism philosophy since the study 
involved construction of hypotheses based on empirical and theoretical 
literature which were tested using statistical analysis of quantitative data. 
Positivism relies more on quantitative measurement that involves testing the 
hypothesis. This study employed longitudinal descriptive research design to 
determine relationships amongst independent and dependent variables. A 
longitudinal research design involves repeated observations of the same 
variables over long periods of time without external influence being applied. 
The design allowed researcher to distinguish between short and long-term 
phenomena, such as performance of firms. This study used a census approach 
and a target population of the study comprised of all companies listed at the 
NSE between 2002 and 2016. The sixty five (65) companies were screened 
Board Tenure: Number of years executive 
directors take in the board 
Board Meetings: Number of board 
meetings. 
Board Tools: Numbers aids tools used by 
Board 
Board Ownership: Proportion of board 
ownership in stock 
Performance of Firms (FPit ) 
• Returns on Assets (ROA) 
• Tobin’s Q (TQ) 
 
Board Activities 
Board Committees: Number of 
committees of the board. 
Board Committees Meetings: Number of 
committees meetings Committee  
Board Remunerations: Compensation to 
board members 
European Scientific Journal October 2018 edition Vol.14, No.28 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
257 
against various factors which included availability of data for the period under 
review and the integrity of data. The data extracted from annual reports 
included: board tenure, board ownership, board tools, board meetings, board 
committees, committees’ meetings and board remuneration. The data extracted 
from published financial statements NSE annual hand books and determined 
included ROA and Tobin’s Q.  
 In this study, it was necessary to ensure no violation of the assumptions 
of the Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) before using the multiple 
linear regression models and the following diagnostic tests were necessary: 
autocorrelation, stationarity, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity. This 
study used descriptive analyses and panel data regression in analyzing the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance of listed 
companies at the NSE Simple regression model were used to test hypothesis: 
Relationship between board activities and Performance of firms (FP).  
H01 -  Board activities does not significantly affect performance of 
firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange 
 The following research hypotheses were tested using the following 
empirical conceptual model 
 FPit = β0+ β1BTit + β2BOit + β3BTit + β4BMit + β5BCit + β6BCMit + β7BRit 
+ci+ έit .Equation 1. 
 Where;  
FP= Firm Performance  
BIit = Board Tenure 
BEit = Board Ownership 
BAit = Board Tools 
BMit = Board Meetings 
BCit = Board Committees 
BCMit = Board Committees Meetings 
BRit = Board Remunerations 
β0= Constant  
β1t= Regression Coefficients  
έit= Error Term  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used to test the 
relationship between study variables. The study adopted random effect 
regression analysis to test hypotheses.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables 
Variable Indicators Min Max Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Board 
Activities 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Board Tenure 1 10 2.8 1.07 1.65 12.933 
Board 
Ownership 0 0.78 0.0846 0.17669 2.332 4.543 
Board Tools 0 5 3.16 0.768 -1.402 4.098 
Board Meetings 0 39 5.52 3.709 3.776 20.893 
No Board 
Committees 0 9 3.18 1.645 0.605 0.379 
Number of 
Committees 
Meetings 0 86 12.27 10.575 2.391 9.26 
Board 
Remuneration 
(Kshs 000) 18 9936000 119037.3 673428.1 12.736 168.083 
Performance 
of firms 
  
ROA -1.382 1.798 0.14883 0.235928 -0.03 8.49 
Tobin’s Q 
-
1.7528 6.7098 1.390516 0.938131 2.148 5.377 
 
 The findings presented in Table 1 indicated that listed firms had 
varying board activities. The mean of board tenure was 2.8, average board 
ownership was 8.4%, board tools had a mean of 3.16 while average board 
meetings were 5.5. The results indicated that average board committees were 
3 and average board committees meetings for listed firm in Kenya were 12. 
Similarly, the finding in Table 1 indicated that listed firms performed different 
during the study period with some firms recording high performance while 
other recording very poor performance.  
 
Trends Analysis of the Board Tenure 
 Among the board activities that the study was interested in is the board 
tenure. The study sought to establish how long the individuals served on the 
board of listed firms in Kenya. The findings are presented in figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Trend Analysis of Board Tenure 
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 The findings showed that there has been a general reducing trend in the 
board tenure among the listed firms in Kenya.  The board tenure reduced form 
an average of 3 years to about two and half years. This trend however, began 
to take effect in 2006 as shown in figure 2 earlier years had almost a constant 
trend in the board tenure. Reduction in the board tenure indicates the need to 
eliminate complacency that is frequently witnessed among individuals that 
stays in the same places for longer.     
 
Trends Analysis of the Board Ownership 
 The board ownership was computed as percentage of stock held by the 
individuals that sit on the boards of the listed firms in Kenya.  
 
Figure 3: Trend Analysis of Board Ownership 
 
 The results presented in figure 3 revealed that there was increase in the 
percentage of the board ownership among the listed firms in Kenya. These 
findings implied that members of the board continued to increase their 
ownership in the companies they serve. However, these trends appear to have 
taken effect in 2005 and increased steadily henceforth. The year 2016 has seen 
the highest percentage board ownership among the listed firms in Kenya.  
 
Trends Analysis of the Board Tools 
 Board tools deals with the numbers of assistants allocated to each board 
members of the listed firms in Kenya.  The trend analysis for board tools for 
the period between 2002 and 2016 is as shown in figure 4 
 
Figure 4: Trend Analysis of Board Tools 
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 The finding showed that there has been a slight increase in the number 
of aids allocated to board members of listed firms in Kenya an average of about 
0.5 as the relevance of corporate governance continues to gain attention the 
role of members of the board continues to increase hence the justification for 
extra aids to assists in additional tasks which justify why there was increase in 
board tools as shown in the figure 4.  
 
Trends Analysis of the Board Meetings 
 The study sought to establish he trend in board meetings among the 
listed firms in Kenya. The results are presented in figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Trend Analysis of Board Meetings 
 
 The results showed that in 2002 average number of board meetings was 
about 5 which increased to about 6 in 2016. These findings are an indication 
that there has been no significant increase on average in the numbers of board 
meetings among the listed firms in Kenya. However, as shown in previous 
section, some companies held a maximum of 9 meetings annually while other 
had a low as three board meetings annually. This was an indication that the 
board in listed firms allowed the management adequate space to operate 
without interference.  
 
Trends Analysis of the Number of Board Committees 
 The number of board committees is another aspect of board activities 
that the study sought to investigate. It is imperatively difficulty for Boards to 
operative without boar committee assigned various functions. This section 
sought to analyse the trend in number of board committees between 2002 and 
2016 among the listed firms in Kenya.  
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Figure 6: Trend Analysis of Number of Board Committees 
 
 Similarly, the study finding showed that there was a slight increase in 
the number of board committees among the listed firms in Kenya. On average 
there were about 2 committees in 2002 which increased to about 3 in 2016 
which implied that listed firms in Kenya have not adopted the concept of 
increasing the number of board committees choosing to remain with the 
traditional numbers of board committees.  
 
Trends Analysis of the Board Committees Meetings 
 The study analysed the number of committees meeting held by the 
members of various board committees of listed firms in Kenya. The trend 
analysis results are presented in figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Trend Analysis of Committees Meetings 
 
 The results revealed that on average there was increase in the number 
of committee meetings across the study period for listed firms in Kenya. 
However, the findings showed that there was slight decrease in the number of 
committee meetings in 2008 and 2013. The number of meetings average 
between 10 and 14 annually as shown in figure 7.  
 
Trends Analysis of the Board Remuneration  
The study also analysed the board remuneration of listed firms in 
Kenya. The board remuneration was computed as fraction of profit before tax 
of the listed firms. The findings are presented in 8.  
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Figure 8: Trend Analysis of Board Remuneration 
 
 The findings showed that board remuneration was highly volatile 
across the study period. The results also showed that board remuneration 
decreased between 2002 and 2016 which indicated that firms’ profits before 
tax increased during the study period or the amount paid to board through 
allowances and salaries decreased. The volatility in board remuneration could 
be justified on the basis of various board activities increase in other board 
activities positively correlates to fluctuation in board remuneration. 
 
Bivariate Relationship Analysis   
 This section contains the correlation results between the board 
activities variables and performance of firms.   
Table 2: Board Activities Variables and Performance Variables 
   
Board 
Tenure 
(1) 
Board 
Ownership 
(2) 
Board 
Tools 
(3) 
Board 
Meetings 
(4) 
No. 
Board 
Committees 
(5) 
Committees 
Meetings (6) 
Board 
Remuneratio
n (7) 
RO
A 
(8) 
Tobin’
s Q (9) 
1 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 1         
2 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n -0.049 1        
3 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n -.238** .127** 1       
4 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 0.002 .528** .249** 1      
5 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n -.079* .242** .329** .457** 1     
6 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 0.023 .340** .226** .663** .808** 1    
7 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n -0.016 -0.014 0.062 -0.008 -0.024 -0.046 1   
8 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n -.092* -.121** 0.062 -.134** -0.035 -.086* 0.059 1  
9 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n -0.021 -.131** -.232** -.184** -.101** -.112** 0.022 
.402
** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
N=750 
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The results for correlation analysis for board activities and performance 
of firm presented in Table 2 revealed that board tenure (r=-0.092, p=0.012), 
board ownership (r=-0.121, p=0.001) and committee meetings (r=-0.086, 
p=0.019) had weak, negative and significant association with ROA. The 
findings implied that increasing these variables would results to reduction in 
ROA. Number of board committees and board remuneration were 
insignificantly associated to ROA. Similarly, the correlation results showed 
that board ownership (r=-0.131, p=0.000), number of board committees (r=-
0.101, p=0.006) and committee meetings (r=-0.112, p=0.002) had weak, 
negative and significant association with Tobin’s Q. The findings also implied 
that increasing these variables would results to reduction in Tobin’s Q. Board 
tenure and board remuneration were insignificantly associated to Tobin’s Q. 
 
Regression Analysis Results  
The study performed tests on statistical assumptions, that is, test of 
regression assumptions and statistics used. This included test of serial 
autocorrelation test, panel unit root test, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity 
test and Hausman test for model specification to make sure the data used was 
adequate to conduct inferential analysis. The tests were conducted to make sure 
that the statistical analysis conducted adhered to regression assumption hence 
avoid spurious and bias findings.  The tests that were used to test various 
diagnostics test are discussed below.  
Table 3: Test of Regression Assumptions 
Test of Assumption Tests Used Criterion  Results  Conclusion  
Normality Test  Shapiro Wilk Test  p>0.05 
p-values for all the 
variables were 
greater than 0.05 
Data was 
normally 
distributed  
Linearity Test  Scatter plots 
upward sloping 
relationship 
upward sloping was 
achieved  
data adhered to 
linearity 
assumption  
Panel Unit Root Test 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 
Statistics  P<0.05 
null hypothesis that 
there is a unit root 
was rejected for all 
the variables  
variables were 
stationary and 
adequate for 
model fitting 
Multicollinearity Test VIF VIF of less than 10 
no problem for 
multicollinearity 
data was 
adequate for 
model fitting 
Serial Autocorrelation 
Test Wooldridge test  
no first order 
autocorrelation was 
rejected at 5% 
Wooldridge f-
statistic had p=value 
of 0.0000 
no first order 
autocorrelation 
Heteroscedasticity Test log likelihood 
null hypothesis states 
that the data 
homoscedastic 
p-value =0.107 was 
greater than 0.000 
null hypothesis 
that panel is 
Homoskedastic 
was not rejected 
Hausman Test for Model 
Specification Hausman test  
null hypothesis for 
Hausman test states 
random effect model is 
the best 
prob>chi2 value of 
0.4877 which is 
greater than critical P 
value at 5% level of 
significance 
The study fitted a 
random effect 
regression model 
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Overall Model Fitting 
 The results of diagnostics revealed that the data was adequate to fit a 
regression model. The results of Hausman specification test further revealed 
that most appropriate model was a RE regression model hence the study fitted 
a random effect model to establish the relationship between corporate 
governance variables and performance of firms. Table 4 contains the findings 
of board structures variables and performance of firms.  
Table 4: Random Effect Model Board Activities and Performance of firms 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  ROA Tobin’s Q 
Board Tenure 0.002        (p=0.838) 0.035    (p=0.434) 
Board Ownership -0.10835  (p=0.268) -0.226   (p=0.574) 
Board Tools -0.00791  (p=0.591) -0.168   (p=0.002) 
Board Meetings -0.00725  (p=0.039) -0.02      (p=0.113) 
Number of Board Committees -0.00774  (p=0.442) -0.026    (p=0.476) 
Committees Meetings 0.0027      (p=0.092) 0.004     (p=0.473) 
Board Remuneration 0.01479    (p=0.218) 0.049      (p=0.25) 
_cons 0.20427    (p=0.002) 1.982      (p=0.000) 
      
  Wald= chi2(7) = 8.87 Wald chi2(7) = 180.83 
  Prob> chi2=0.2619 Prob >chi2  = 0.0088 
  R-sq:  within  = 0.0107 R-sq:  within  = 0.022 
 
 Table 4 presents the RE regression model used to ascertain the 
relationship between board activities and ROA. The results of Prob>chi2= 
0.2619 revealed that the overall model was statistically insignificant which 
implied that board activities were insignificant predictors of ROA. Only board 
meetings had a significant effect on ROA, all other board activities variables 
had an insignificant effect on ROA.  The findings implied that a change in 
board activities would not significantly affect ROA.  
 Table 4 also presents the model fitted to establish the relationship 
between board activities and performance measured by Tobin’s Q among listed 
firms in Kenya. The results of Prob>chi2= 0.0088 revealed that the overall 
model was statistically significant which implied that board activities were 
significant predictors of Tobin’s Q.  
 Board tenure, (β=0.035, p=0.434), Committees Meetings (β=0.004, 
p=0.473), and Board Remuneration (β=0.049, p=0.250) were found to have a 
positive but insignificant effect on Tobin’s Q among listed firms in Kenya. On 
the other hand, board ownership (β=-0.226, p=0.574), board tools (β=-0.168, 
p=0.002), board meetings (β=-0.020, p=0.113), and number of board 
committees (β=-0.026, p=0.476) were found to have negatively affected the 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q in listed firms in Kenya. However, only 
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board tools significant affected the performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The 
findings implied that the board activities such as board tenure, board 
ownership, board tools, board meetings, board committees and number of 
board committees adopted by listed firms in Kenya failed to significant impacts 
on performance of firm or they negatively affected the performance of listed 
firms in Kenya 
 
Model 1 
FPit (ROA) = 0.20427+ 0.002BTit + -0.10835BOit + -0.00791BTit + -
0.00725BMit + -0.00774 BCit + 0.0027BCMit +0.01479 BRit +ci +έit 
Model 2 
FPit (Tobin’s Q) = 0.035+ -0.226BTit + -0.168BOit + -0.02BTit + -0.026BMit + 
0.004 BCit + 0.049BCMit +1.982 BRit +ci +έit 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
 An increasing trend was observed in other board activities variables 
such board ownership, board meetings, board tools, board committees and 
number of committees meetings. The study findings on the other hand revealed 
reducing trend in board tenure and board remuneration of listed firms Kenya. 
This was inferred to indicate that listed firms in Kenya have been strengthening 
their corporate governance over the study period. Regression analysis 
indicated that board activities are insignificant predators of Return on Assets. 
However board tenure, committees meetings and board remuneration were 
found to have a positive but insignificant effect on Tobin’s Q among listed 
firms in Kenya. Board ownership board tools, board meetings and number 
board committees were found to have negatively affected the performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q in listed firms in Kenya. However, only board tools 
significant affected the performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The study 
concluded that listed firms in Kenya adopted corporate governance practices 
as part of the requirements of the regulating authority which had not impact on 
the specific company’s performance. The study established that most of the 
corporate governance practices adopted by listed firms in Kenya had an 
insignificant effect of the Performance of firms. The study concluded listed 
firms in Kenya strengthened their corporate governance due to poor 
performance, further the study concluded that corporate governance practices 
used by listed firms failed to impact on performance or had negative impact on 
performance. The study also concluded that listed firms in Kenya continued to 
record poor performance despite corporate governance investments. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Based on the findings, the study recommended that listed firms should 
revisit their corporate governance practices to ensure that they leverage on 
board structures that improve performance while insignificant board structures 
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practices should be abolished.  The shareholders of listed firms may adopt the 
findings of this study to restructures their board structures by doing away with 
board structures and activities that have no effect of Performance of firms or 
realigning them to make them more effective. The stakeholders may also use 
the findings of this study to open inquiry on effectiveness of board activities in 
their respective firms for future improvement.  Based on the findings of this 
study, stakeholders of listed firms and regulating authority such as Capital 
Market Authority may relook at the board activities policies of listed firms with 
the view revising the existing policies or formulating new and more 
progressive policies to ensure shareholder interests are protected. These 
policies may go a long way to ensure listed firms not only strengthened their 
board activities during poor performing seasons but rather clear systems and 
activities that provide a clear roadmap to guide board operations.   
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